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No One Statute Should Have Too Much 
Power: How Electing Not to Amend 42 
U.S.C § 1320(a)–7(b) May Frustrate the 
Purpose of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act 
Amber C. Dawson* 
The over breadth of the Federal Anti-Kickback statute as amended 
by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) holds 
dangerous implications for the future of the health care 
marketplace. When a statute permits criminal, civil and 
administrative punishment for an overbroad category of 
innocuous actions, such a statute must also take into account the 
specific, rather than general, intent of the actor, or the ensnaring 
of innocents is ultimately likely to result. Historically, the statute 
required a finding of specific intent to be found to uphold a 
violation of the statute. With the passing of Greber v. US and the 
Federal Anti-kickback statute’s amendment by the PPACA to 
encompass almost any act not enumerated as a safe harbor, 
prosecutors have been given remarkable power to decide when 
and who to prosecute, and almost anyone participating in the 
health care marketplace may find their self at risk of violating the 
law. Prosecutors have also been given the remarkable power to 
decide what constitutes genuine patient protection as we enter 
into a new chapter of American health care. 
                                                                                                             
 *  Managing Editor, University of Miami Business Law Review, Volume 25; Juris 
Doctor Candidate 2017, University of Miami School of Law. Bachelor of Science in 
Journalism with an Outside Concentration 2014, University of Florida. I would like to 
thank my Health Law Fundamentals I Professor, Jodi Laurence, for inspiring me to write 
about the dangers of the over breadth of legal doctrine in one of the nation’s largest business 
sectors. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Andre and Vanessa Dawson, who have 
continually encouraged me to never stop fighting for what I believe in and constantly 
reminding me of what I am capable of when I work hard. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine suffering from a debilitating disease for decades before 
finally finding a physician or health care specialist able to meet your 
medical needs to your personal level of satisfaction. Then, imagine 
traveling to that medical care provider’s office for your next appointment 
only to find it completely vacant with a padlocked front door. After calling 
the office several times attempting to understand and make sense of the 
situation, the phone never stops ringing. In fact, the voice mailbox has 
been turned off, and you, the sick and vulnerable patient, are left without 
answers. On the news later that night, a story breaks that your physician 
was arrested for allegedly committing health care fraud. 
In the latest era of American health care under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (hereinafter “PPACA” or “the Act”), combating 
health care fraud has been an extremely high priority of the federal 
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government1, which has caused many patients to face the predicament 
described above. One of the federal government’s most powerful weapons 
in combatting health care fraud and abuse has been the federal anti-
kickback statute2 (hereinafter “the Statute”) as amended by the PPACA3. 
This comment will discuss how one immensely powerful, constantly 
amended, and overly broad statute possesses the ability to frustrate major 
purposes of the PPACA in the health care marketplace. Part II of this 
comment summarizes and explains the historical development of the 
federal anti-kickback statute and the impact that the Statute has on 
frustrating major end-goals of the PPACA, which call for the Statute’s 
amendment. Part III of this comment will discuss the Statute’s ability to 
set the national tone concerning what constitutes acceptable patient 
protection practices and acceptable methods by which the government 
may achieve affordable health care in the American health care 
marketplace. Part IV addresses potential methods by which the federal 
government may restrict the federal anti-kickback statute’s power to 
frustrate major purposes of the PPACA, while simultaneously allowing 
the Statute to aid law enforcement in the fight against health care fraud. 
II. STRUGGLING WITH THE TRANSLATION OF REFERRAL 
REMUNERATIONS 
A. The Federal Government’s Fight to Kick Back Against Health 
Care Fraud 
Understanding the current impact of the federal anti-kickback statute 
on the government’s ability to combat health care fraud under the PPACA 
requires an understanding of the historical development of the Statute as 
well as the PPACA’s purpose, and how the Act changed the Statute. The 
federal anti-kickback statute was enacted under the Social Security 
Amendments of 1972 as a misdemeanor criminal statute.4 When enacted, 
the primary concern of the government was “outlawing health care 
                                                                                                             
1 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f)(2), 
124 Stat. 119, 759 (2010). 
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2006); see also 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. (2010). 
3 See § 1320a-7b; see also § 1001.952.  
4 See Shannon Barnet, 20 things to know about the Anti-Kickback Statute, BECKER’S 
HOSPITAL REVIEW (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulator
y-issues/20-things-to-know-about-the-anti-kickback-statute.html; see also State v. Harden, 
938 So.2d 480, 486-90 (2006) (citing Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92–603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972)). 
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referrals that were considered unethical or inappropriate.”5 The original 
language of the Statute stated: 
w]hoever furnishes items or services to an individual for 
which payment is or may be made under this title6 and 
who solicits, offers, or receives any: 1) kickback or bribe 
in connection with furnishing of such items or services or 
making or receipt of such payment; or 2) rebate of any fee 
or charge for referring any such individual to another 
person for furnishing of such items or services shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned for 1 year or both.7 
In 1977, as Medicare and Medicaid fraud continued to drive up the 
costs of health care,8 Congress passed the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud 
and Abuse Amendments.9 The 1977 amendments increased the severity of 
the criminal penalty for a violation of the Statute from a misdemeanor to 
a felony, punishable by up to five years of imprisonment and/or a fine of 
$25,000,10 and broadened the existing language of the Statute in order to 
promote deterrence.11 Instead of centrally focusing on kickbacks, rebates 
and bribes as the original language of the Statute had,12 the language of the 
1977 version of the Statute focused on remuneration generally, given 
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind.13 The change 
in the language of the Statute resulted from complaints by federal 
prosecutors who were pursuing health care fraud cases and who had 
complained to Congress that the previous language of the statute was 
“unclear and needed clarification”14 to ensure successful prosecution. 
                                                                                                             
5 See Harden, 938 So.2d at 488-90. (citing Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. 
L. No. 92–603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972)). 
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2) (2006). 
7 Harden, 938 So.2d at 488. (citing Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92–603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972)); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2); Social Security 
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977). 
8 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977). 
9 See Shannon Barnet, 20 things to know about the Anti-Kickback Statute, BECKER’S 
HOSPITAL REVIEW (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulator
y-issues/20-things-to-know-about-the-anti-kickback-statute.html. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 
1329, 1419 (1972). 
13 See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977). 
14 See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
988 (1985) (citing H. Rep. No. 393, Part II, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 53, reprinted in 1977 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3039, 3055). 
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Although the Statute had always imposed criminal liability, the Statute 
did not require a finding of criminal intent until it was amended in 1980.15 
As amended, the Statute required the government to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an individual or entity “knowingly and willfully” 
violated the Statute before he, she or it could be convicted of violating the 
Statute.16 Courts immediately struggled trying to interpret what actions 
would constitute a knowing and willful violation of the statute and what 
exactly constituted remuneration17. In 1985, the Supreme Court clarified 
what degree of criminal conduct is required to successfully convict an 
individual  for violating the Statute.18 In Greber, the Court established the 
“one purpose” test, holding that so long as one purpose of giving, 
receiving, offering or soliciting any remuneration was to induce referrals 
for services payable by a federal health care program, the anti-kickback 
statute is violated, even if the remuneration was also intended for another 
subject purpose.19 In short, any remuneration given or received where one 
purpose of the remuneration was to induce referrals for health care items 
or services payable in part or in full by a federal health care program 
violated the Statute and subjected both the referee and the referrer to 
criminal liability.20 
Years later, “[t]he OIG was given authority to issue civil penalties in 
addition to the already authorized criminal penalties . . . under The 
Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987.”21 
This meant that the overly broad, constantly changing, and complex 
criminal Statute could lead to health care providers, and any other person 
for that matter, being found both criminally and civilly liable for actions 
that either party may not have been aware would be considered illegal 
remunerations under the law. 
While referrals historically play a large role in many professional 
industries and the offering and soliciting of referrals were perfectly legal 
practices in industries outside of the health care industry,22 referrals 
became felonious criminal activity within the health care industry.23 And 
still, health care providers had no definitive answers as to what exactly 
                                                                                                             
15 See Barnet, supra note 4. 
16 See id. 
17 Id. 
18 See Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985). 
19 See id. at 72. 
20 See Barnet, supra note 4. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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constituted giving or receiving remuneration for a referral given the broad 
language of the Statute.24 
In light of the broad scope of the Statute at the time, the Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) was mandated under the Medicare and Medicaid 
Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 to create regulatory safe 
harbors.25 The safe harbors were intended to provide health care providers 
with protection from liability where their actions may have otherwise 
earlier resulted in a violation of the Statute. Meeting every requirement of 
a safe harbor would ensure an individual or entity could not be found in 
violation of the Statute for a specific practice which completely complied 
with an anti-kickback statute safe harbor, and would protect the individual 
or entity against liability and future criminal prosecution.26 The OIG’s 
initial set of proposed anti-kickback statute safe harbors was first 
announced in 1993 and finalized in 1999.27 
Because many individuals involved in the business of health care were 
still confused by the anti-kickback statute and what practices constituted a 
violation, the OIG continued to propose and enact a total of what are 
currently 2528 safe harbors that are acceptable and would not violate the 
Statute.29 The OIG, however, still had not clarified whether the 
government had to prove general intent or specific intent to sustain a 
conviction for a violation of the Statute in situations where a safe harbor 
was not met.30 
While issues sustaining convictions did not arise in cases where 
defendants clearly intended to engage in gross conduct in violation of the 
Statute and were well aware of the legal consequences of such conduct, 
issues arose in situations where individuals alleged that they were 
completely unaware that their actions violated the law and that their 
payment practices constituted remuneration under the Statute. The federal 
government saw the issue as one where a broad interpretation was 
necessary: 
Medicare, Medicaid and other government health care 
programs depend on physicians and other health care 
professionals to exercise independent judgment in the 
best interests of patients. Although monetary and other 
                                                                                                             
24 See Harden, 938 So.2d at 488-90. 
25 See Pub. L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987) § 3. 
26 Id. 
27 See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback 
56 Fed. Reg. 35932 (July 29, 1991). 
28 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2010). 
29 See id. (explaining which payment practices do not constitute a violation of the federal 
anti-kickback statute). 
30 Id. 
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incentives tied to referrals are commonly accepted and 
legal in many businesses, such acts can corrupt the health 
care industry and harm federal programs. When a 
physician refers a patient to a provider because of some 
financial self-interest, the physician is not necessarily 
making the decision in the patient’s best interests. Unfair 
competition results when honest providers must compete 
with those who unlawfully pay to generate business. This 
systematic corruption of federal health care programs 
defrauds the public.31 
The problem remained, though, that while the government’s overall 
goal of curbing fraud was a desirable one, innocent health care providers 
could become ensnared by the Statute’s overarching reach.32 
B. What Is Fraud and What Is Fair in the New Era of Affordable 
Health Care? 
The PPACA, also known as the Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare, 
was passed under President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010.33 In an 
effort to reform the American health care system, the PPACA, for fraud 
purposes, aimed to make health care affordable for all Americans,34 to 
improve “the quality and efficiency of health care,”35 and to eliminate the 
impact of fraudulent, abusive and wasteful health care practices of 
providers on the high costs of health care.36 But how would the 
government eliminate the impact of fraud on the high costs of health care? 
To realize the end goals of the PPACA, the federal anti-kickback statute, 
now entitled “Criminal Penalties for acts involving federal health care 
programs” under the PPACA, was amended “to provide that claims 
submitted in violation of the [S]tatute automatically constitute false claims 
                                                                                                             
31 Scott Oswald, Esq., and David Scher, Esq., Health care law expands False Claims 
Act liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute, EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP, 3-4, (last visited 
Jan 2, 2016 10:30 AM), https://www.employmentlawgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/Anti
Kickback-Statute-False-Claims-Lawyers.pdf. 
32 Scott Oswald Esq., and David Scher, Esq., Health care law expands False Claims Act 
liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute, Employment Law Group, 3-4 (last visited Jan. 2, 
2016, 10:30 AM), http://www.employmentlawgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/AntiKickb
ack-Statute-False-Claims-Lawyers.pdf. 
33 See id. 
34 Affordable Health Care for America, THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, AND EDUC. AND LABOR (Jan. 4, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://housedoc
s.house.gov/energycommerce/SUMMARY.pdf 
35 Id. at 2-3. 
36 Id. 
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for purposes of the False Claims Act.”37 Congress also added a new section 
that eliminates the requirement that a person have actual knowledge of the 
law or specific intent to commit a violation of the statute.38 Because of 
these two significant changes, health care providers and other individuals 
who had no knowledge of the Statute can no longer argue that they lacked 
the intent to “knowingly and willfully” violate the Statute as a defense to 
criminal and civil liability under both the Statute and the False Claims 
Act.39 Notable is the fact that there are separate, severe penalties for every 
violation of both the Statute and the False Claims Act.40 As the Statute 
currently exists, a single violation, including the filing of a single false 
claim for medical items or services paid in part or in full by a federal health 
care program, constitutes a felony punishable by a fine of up to $25,000 
and/or up to five years of imprisonment.41 In addition to the criminal 
penalties, anyone involved in the business of health care who is convicted 
under the Statute as it currently exists is also subject to civil monetary 
penalties,42 to potential exclusion from the Medicare and/or Medicaid 
programs, and to administrative penalties.43 
Despite the Statute’s broad definition of remuneration and elimination 
of its specific intent requirement, the long-term impact that the federal 
anti-kickback statute may have on the PPACA actually being able to 
ensure patient protection and make health care affordable remains 
unanswered. Moreover, the meaning of “knowingly and willfully”44 
exchanging remuneration can encompass behaviors so innocuous that 
even courts have issues discerning when and why the Statute has been 
violated.45 When the courts are unsure whether an individual’s actions 
constitute a violation of the Statute, it seems commonsensical that a lay 
juror or potential violator would find it difficult to determine what actions 
constitute a violation as well. As such, the overly broad Statute has 
essentially been broadened even further by the PPACA, allowing the 
government, as well as private individuals bringing claims under the False 
Claims Act, the discretion to go after the deepest pockets in the health care 
business, both criminally and civilly.46 
                                                                                                             
37 Oswald & Scher, supra note 31 at 3. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). 
42 See Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. 
45 See Harden, 938 So.2d at 487-89. 
46 See, e.g., Heather Stauffer, Lancaster County hospital among many that will pay to 
settle false billing allegations, LANCASTER ONLINE (Dec 20, 2015, 1:06 PM), http://lancas
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III. THE THREATENING LEGAL IMPACT OF FEDERAL HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD: PROSECUTORS’ FAVORITE TOOL ON COMBATING FRAUD 
The government’s ability to choose between prosecuting or 
monetarily settling with health care providers and entities who violate the 
Statute calls into question how important patient protection actually is to 
the federal government when allegedly fraudulent, wealthy providers are 
able to bypass criminal prosecution and felony convictions by reaching 
monetary settlements with the government.47 The government’s 
philosophy seems simple. When health care entities and individuals 
choose to settle in lieu of prosecution, a large portion of the settlement 
funds are funneled back into federal health care programs in order to 
increase the funds available to Medicare and Medicaid patients and make 
health care more affordable.48 Simultaneously, the government is given 
the broad discretion to choose which medical providers (many of whom 
may or may not be aware they have committed crimes) it will and will not 
pursue. The government’s ability to arbitrarily pick and choose which 
wealthy providers who violate the Statute will pay the costs to make 
American health care more “affordable” also calls into question what 
methods Americans are willing to find as acceptable means of funding a 
health care system for all. 
A. Where Is the Patient Protection? 
The government’s reliance on the powerful federal anti-kickback 
statute as amended under the PPACA poses several issues that may impact 
the ability of the PPACA to achieve its goal of greater patient protection. 
The potent impact of the Statute as it currently exists calls for its 
amendment yet again given its potential impact on the future of patient 
protection in the American health care system. First, the Statute allows for 
the immediate arrest and future criminal prosecution of individuals and 
entities involved in the business of health care; yet the PPACA provides 
no guidelines for patients as to how they should respond in instances when 
their medical care providers are either imprisoned or incarcerated. Second, 
the PPACA also provides no guidelines on how other medical care 
providers should view the validity of incoming patients’ medical history 
and records documented by health care providers who have been convicted 
under the Statute. Third, the PPACA provides no means or methods by 
                                                                                                             
teronline.com/news/local/lancaster-county-hospital-among-many-that-will-pay-to-
settle/article_b39b0b26-a5ac-11e5-8a43-63c3febc16f2.html. 
47 Id. 
48 See Affordable Health Care for America, THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, AND EDUC. AND LABOR (Jan. 4, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://housedo
cs.house.gov/energycommerce/SUMMARY.pdf 
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which patients whose health care providers are convicted under the Statute 
can obtain their past medical records once the providers are convicted and 
incarcerated. Further, the PPACA does not require health care providers 
who have been indicted, accused, or are awaiting trial for violating the 
Statute to disclose those facts to their existing or past patients. Without 
notice, patients may not be aware that they may need to start searching for 
an affordable, competent health care provider until they learn of their 
potentially fraudulent provider’s conviction. Despite these problems, the 
federal anti-kickback statute has been one of the most powerful and 
frequently used tools of law enforcement in the fight against health care 
fraud—another goal of the PPACA. Consequently, while the Statute does 
have the power to combat health care fraud and eliminate fraudulent 
providers,49 it also has the potential to decrease patient protection. This is 
the harsh reality that exists on the opposite end of the patient-protection 
spectrum, and these are the reasons the Statute must be amended yet again 
to better ensure the patient protection purpose of the PPACA is not 
frustrated. 
B. The Current Costs of Making Health Care Affordable for All 
Not only does the government’s reliance on the Statute and the 
Statute’s broad applicability to the business of health care frustrate the end 
goal of patient protection, but its reliance also may frustrate the objective 
of making health care affordable through the best potential means. Given 
its overly broad nature and absence of actual knowledge or specific intent 
requirement for an individual or entity to be convicted for its violation,50 
the government has wide latitude when choosing against whom the Statute 
will be enforced. Since even the most innocuous of business arrangements, 
including business arrangements perfectly legal in other business 
industries, may violate the Statute,51 the government can theoretically 
choose to target certain groups of health care providers and arbitrarily 
enforce the law. 
The government also has the ability to drop criminal charges and 
pursue False Claims Act civil litigation against entities with deeper 
pockets, and to use the Statute’s criminal penalties as leverage to 
incentivize individuals and entities in the health care business to settle and 
avoid jail time. Notably, the government has a significantly lower burden 
                                                                                                             
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f)(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). 
51 See, e.g., Lisa A. Estrada, Physicians Face Increased Anti-Kickback Enforcement 
Focus, HEALTH CARE LAW TODAY (June 23, 2015), https://www.healthcarelawtoday.com/
2015/06/23/physicians-face-increased-anti-kickback-enforcement-focus/. 
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in a civil case as opposed to a criminal case, which disadvantages the 
accused.52 Threatened into choosing between fighting a felony criminal 
prosecution, which can carry immense legal fees and up to five years of 
imprisonment per violation, or settling with the federal government for 
millions of dollars civilly, some providers may feel the latter is the most 
affordable and least risky of the two alternatives—even when they do not 
admit guilt and honestly believed that they were complying with the law.53 
Thus, innocent health care providers may end up settling for millions of 
dollars not only to avoid crushing attorney’s fees, but also because they 
feel it is their best alternative to potential imprisonment.54 The Statute thus 
creeps into the innocuous business practices of innocent individuals and 
leads them to turn over their hard-earned funds in order to fund the 
Medicare and Medicaid health care programs. 
Undoubtedly, there are cases so egregiously unethical and deplorable 
that they should result in the accused forfeiting illegally received funds to 
federal health care programs as reimbursement.55 In those cases, the 
government should be able to capitalize on the power of the federal anti-
kickback statute and restore illegally obtained funds to federal health care 
programs and impose severe terms of imprisonment.56 But, funding federal 
health care programs by taking away the hard-earned money of some of 
our nation’s brightest, life-saving, and potentially innocent health care 
providers is an unacceptable means of making health care affordable for 
all Americans. 
When innocent Americans can become entangled in innocuous 
situations that threaten penalties and punishments as severe as those 
imposed under the current version of the federal anti-kickback statute, it is 
completely natural for said individuals not to have alarm bells going off in 
their heads given that they are supposed to be the patients the government 
aims to protect under the PPACA. In fact, they shouldn’t have alarm bells 
going off in their heads. The alarm bells should be going off in the heads 
of our elected legislators, alerting them to existing problems with the 
Statute as it currently exists post-PPACA amendments, and causing them 
to realize that the Statute needs to be amended to ensure patient protection 
while making health care affordable, rather than increasing patient 
frustration and making health care affordable by unscrupulous means. 
                                                                                                             
52 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). 
53 See, e.g., Stauffer, supra note 46. 
54 Id. 
55 See, e.g., Detroit Area Doctor Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison for Providing 
Medically Unnecessary Chemotherapy to Patients (2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
detroit-area-doctor-sentenced-45-years-prison-providing-medically-unnecessary-
chemotherapy (last updated July 10, 2015). 
56 Id. 
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Though innocent health care providers may not always be the targets 
of criminal charges following a violation of the Statute, the position in 
which these providers find themselves gives prosecutors the arbitrary 
latitude to threaten them with prosecution in exchange for testimony 
against individuals who are not innocent or blatantly guilty. The broad 
language of the Statute also gives prosecutors discretion to go after certain 
health care providers and agencies. As a result, making large amounts of 
money may no longer be the goal of many providers, and the quality of 
care they provide may also no longer be as important when they are forced 
by the government to provide services to more individuals at a lower cost 
or face punishment. 
V. THE DAMAGED AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: HOW ARE 
WE GOING TO FIX IT? 
To allow the PPACA’s major purposes to be realized and to 
reasonably decrease U.S.C. § 1320(A)-7(B)’S ability to have such 
controlling weight over the future of the American health care system, 
several approaches are available to the government to curtail the Statute’s 
power by amendment. 
A. The Patient Protection Focus Requires Patient Protecting 
Notice 
As U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) and the PPACA are currently drafted, no 
provision of either law provides for a notice requirement for victims of 
health care fraud.57 Therefore, there are no requirements that an individual 
such as the person identified in the opening hypothetical be made aware 
when their health care providers have been arrested for, or convicted of, 
violating U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b). The absence of a notice provision for 
health care fraud victims in these situations leaves patients unprotected 
when they are most vulnerable, and that circumstance may result from one 
simple unintended violation of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b).58 One way to ensure 
that patient protection is realized under the PPACA is for Congress to 
amend the PPACA to require that health care providers provide notice to 
their previous and existing patients when they have been arrested or 
convicted of health care fraud. 
One way of understanding the necessity of a notice requirement can 
be demonstrated through health care fraud cases involving physical risk to 
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patients.59 In some instances of fraud which violate U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b), 
health care providers have subjected patients to medical procedures that 
can be dangerous, unnecessary, and oftentimes, deadly.60 The National 
Health Care Anti-Fraud Association demonstrated the necessity of 
providing notice to patients when they have been victims of fraud through 
the following case: 
In June 2002, . . . a Chicago cardiologist was sentenced to 
12-1/2 years in federal prison and was ordered to pay 
$16.5 million in fines and restitution after pleading guilty 
to performing 750 medically unnecessary heart 
catheterizations, along with unnecessary angioplasties 
and other tests as part of a 10-year fraud scheme. Three 
other physicians and a hospital administrator also pleaded 
guilty and received prison sentences for their part in the 
scheme, which resulted in the deaths of at least two 
patients . . . .The physicians and hospital induced 
hundreds of homeless persons, substance abusers, and 
elderly men and women to feign symptoms and be 
admitted to the hospital for the unnecessary procedures. 
How? By offering them incentives such as food, cash and 
cigarettes. ‘There were 750 people who had needles stuck 
into their hearts purely for profit, not because they needed 
it,’ said one of the federal prosecutors.61 (quotations 
removed) 
Given that many of the patients in this case were homeless individuals, 
many of them may never have been informed that the procedures they 
endured had potentially deadly side effects and were essentially performed 
for profit. 
Patients faced with cases of egregious health care fraud, such as the 
vulnerable victims in this Chicago case, deserve to be provided with 
answers. They deserve to be provided with notice of their rights, and they 
deserve to be provided with guidelines as to what steps they may take to 
ensure their current and future personal health and safety, as well as to 
ensure justice. Therefore, Congress should amend the PPACA to provide 
a notice provision for patients who are victims of fraudulent health care 
                                                                                                             
59 See The Challenge of Health Care Fraud, NAT’L HEALTH CARE ANTI-FRAUD ASS’N, 
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providers, as well as provisions outlining any necessary or appropriate 
steps victims may take in these instances. 
B. Outlining the Impacts of Health Care Fraud on Patient Medical 
History Records 
False billing and overbilling are two major ways by which health care 
fraud takes place in the American health care system.62 In some health care 
fraud schemes, this takes place in the form of health care providers 
deliberately misdiagnosing patients and performing procedures that could 
potentially remain in their patients’ medical histories for the rest of their 
lives.63 Though U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) in connection with the PPACA 
provides for available punishments against fraudulent providers in these 
instances, the PPACA neglects to take into account the validity and 
reliability of the medical histories of patients who have been the victims 
of fraudulent providers.64 This may lead to patients feeling unprotected 
and unsure of the reliability and validity of their medical records and 
histories, as well as necessary doctor’s visits to validate or verify their 
health statuses after they’ve become aware that they may be a victim of 
health care fraud. 
Fraudulent providers can also create severe problems for individuals 
by creating false records despite never having provided care. Examples of 
these lingering injustices for victims of health care fraud have been shown 
by the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association in a Consumer Alert 
about the impact of health care fraud on patients.65 The Consumer Alert 
provided the following real-life case: 
A Boston-area psychiatrist . . . forfeited $1.3 million and 
was sentenced to several years in federal prison following 
his late-1990s conviction on 136 counts of mail fraud, 
money laundering and witness intimidation related to his 
fraudulent billing of several health insurers for psychiatric 
therapy sessions that never took place-using the names 
and insurance information of many people whom he 
actually had never met, let alone treated. (He also went so 
far as to write fictitious longhand session notes to ensure 
phony backup for his phony claims.) . . . In fabricating the 
claims, the psychiatrist also fabricated diagnoses for those 
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§ 6402(f)(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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“patients”-many of them adolescents. The phony 
conditions he assigned to them included ‘depressive 
psychosis,’ ‘suicidal ideation,’ ‘sexual identity problems’ 
and ‘behavioral problems in school.’66  
Notably, both U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) and the PPACA also neglect to 
outline and describe how much credit and/or weight a patient’s future 
health care providers should give to the medical records and histories of 
patients who are victims of fraudulent health care providers. 
Since U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) is broad enough to hold providers 
accountable for an endless list of technically, though not willfully, 
fraudulent practices, and broad enough to create victims out of those 
providers’ patients, more patients may also be at risk of their health care 
providers being accused or convicted of fraud. Congress can better ensure 
patient protection and alleviate this issue (which is clearly an undesirable 
potential impact of the PPACA) by amending the PPACA to outline how 
medical fraud victims’ medical records and histories should be viewed by 
their future health care providers, and by providing guidelines for victims 
of fraud to follow should they find themselves in such a predicament. 
C. Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: Variations in Sentencing 
Between Specific Intent and General Intent Violators 
Undoubtedly, health care fraud is an issue of national concern. 
Considering the health care industry is one of the largest and fastest 
growing in America,67 it is no surprise that individuals specifically target 
the health care industry with the intent to commit fraud.68 However, given 
the broad language of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b), it is possible that many 
innocent individuals and entities entering the industry may take actions in 
violation of the Statute completely unaware that their practices may be 
considered illegal and that they may be subject to felony prosecution.69 In 
those instances, courts have historically found that ignorance of the law is 
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68 See e.g., Detroit Area Doctor Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison for Providing Medically 
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Three Therapists Sentenced for Their Roles in $63 Million Miami Health Care Fraud 
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69 See, e.g., Meredith Cohn, Justice Department settles with hundreds of hospitals, 10 in 
Maryland, over defibrillators, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 30, 2015, 7:55 PM), http://www.
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no excuse. This strict enforcement view can be understood given the 
devastating impact health care fraud has had on the American economy 
over the years, as well as by examining some of the most egregious cases.70 
In FY 2014, the federal government recovered $1.9 billion more in 
fraudulently obtained health care funds than it had in FY 2013.71 The year 
2014 saw the recovery of $5.7 billion in fraudulently obtained health care 
dollars,72 which if unrecovered, would drive up the costs of health care for 
all Americans. The severity of punishment for a single violation of the 
statute makes sense in terms of cracking down on fraudulent providers.73 
Since 2007, the government has charged over 2,300 accused health care 
fraudsters with collectively billing Medicare and/or Medicaid for over $7 
billion in fraudulent claims.74 The need for the government to be able to 
effectively fight health care fraud to ensure patient protection and 
affordable care for all, as well as law enforcement’s eagerness to rely on 
the Statute to combat fraud can be easily understood in light of some of 
the largest health care fraud cases of 2015. 
In Michigan, a state where health care fraud has been a serious 
problem, Dr. Farid Fata, M.D. pleaded guilty not only to conspiring to pay 
kickbacks, but also to conspiring to receive kickbacks.75 Chief Richard 
Weber, of the Internal Revenue Service, called the case of Dr. Fata “the 
most egregious case of fraud and deception” that he’d seen in his entire 
career.76 According to the Department of Justice, Dr. Fata was a licensed 
medical doctor who owned and operated a cancer treatment center through 
which he admitted to “prescribing and administering unnecessary 
aggressive chemotherapy, canter treatments . . . and other infusion 
therapies to patients in order to increase his billings to Medicare and other 
health insurance companies.”77 Chief Richard Weber perfectly summed up 
                                                                                                             
70 See, e.g., Detroit Area Doctor Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison for Providing 
Medically Unnecessary Chemotherapy to Patients, supra note 55. 
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the needs for better patient protection overall and for the government to 
recover illegally obtained funds as demonstrated by Dr. Fata’s case: 
Dr. Fata not only defrauded the government out of 
millions of dollars, but he lied to his patients about their 
health and intentionally put their lives at risk.  In fact, 
because of his lies, some of those patients who he was 
entrusted to care for likely died as a result of his 
actions.  This defendant greedily cared more about his 
own financial well-being than the lives of his 
patients.  This disgusting and diabolical scheme has hurt 
hundreds of patients and their families and stolen from 
them something that no punishment from the court can do 
to make them whole.78 
Unfortunately, specific intent-based violations of health care fraud laws 
such as Dr. Fata’s are not at all uncommon; especially in South Florida, 
where some of the largest health care fraud schemes have taken place. 
In August 2015, a formal medical director and three therapists were 
convicted in a health care fraud scheme where a total of 22 defendants 
were charged after the now defunct mental health care center they 
allegedly worked for submitted79 “approximately $63.7 million in false 
and fraudulent claims (also considered kickbacks) to Medicare, and 
received payments” amounting in around $28 million paid out by 
Medicare for claims of services that in some instances were never even 
provided.80  In addition to paying kickbacks to assisted living facility 
owners and operators in Miami for Medicare patient referrals, health care 
providers at the mental health clinic also fabricated medical records “to 
support false and fraudulent claims for partial hospitalization program 
services that were not medically necessary and often never provided.81 
“Notably, in that case, the victims were elderly mental health patients 
suffering from Alzheimer’s and dementia who were unaware of any 
existing scheme and the fact that they were actually being defrauded.82 
Here, the need for patient protection was undeniable. In the Government’s 
Consolidated Sentencing Memorandum in the case, Allan Medina, trial 
attorney, United States Department of Justice Criminal Division, Fraud 
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Section, explained why the egregious conduct of the defendants called for 
serious patient protection: 
[T]he fraud at Health Care Solutions Network, Inc. 
(“HCSN”) victimized Medicare and Medicaid and the 
very patients the Defendants and their co-conspirators 
purported to help. For years – not days, weeks, or months 
– the Defendants took advantage of some of society’s 
most vulnerable people – individuals suffering from 
dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, mental retardation and 
other debilitating psychiatric conditions, as well as 
individuals that may have desperately needed, but never 
received, legitimate PHP treatment. HSCN was a criminal 
enterprise built on lies and deceit, and these Defendants 
played a vital role in its assembly line of fraud83 . . . 
Without a doubt, the fraud at HCSN would not have 
flourished without Rousseau, as he was HCSN’s Medical 
Director from day one. For more than six years, he blindly 
signed HCSN medical records and recruited others to fuel 
the fraud, including other doctors—Dr. Villamil and Dr. 
Manley—and an intake assessment specialist from a 
hospital in South Florida—Francisco Pabon—who agreed 
to sell patients to HCSN in exchange for cash payments 
and gift cards. Patients who may have needed medical 
attention were beside the point; the patients at HCSN were 
commodities, and Rousseau allowed unlicensed 
professionals, such as Dana Gonzalez, to play doctor in 
his stead.84 
As egregious as these cases may undoubtedly be, the majority of 
serious health care fraud is committed by a minute fraction of money-
hungry health care providers consciously acting both knowingly and 
willfully with the specific intent to defraud the government for their own 
personal gain.85 However, not all violations of health care fraud are so 
egregious. In the cases of general intent violators, the dominating use and 
effect of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b), which essentially forces health care 
professionals to settle with the federal government for millions of dollars 
though they may have not knowingly and willfully violated the law, calls 
into question how much power the federal government should have over 
the health care industry under a single statute. 
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In a recent case, more than 130 hospitals agreed to a settlement with 
the federal government which will cause them to pay more than $105 
million to resolve allegations that the hospitals submitted Medicare claims 
for medically unnecessary procedures,86 each of which was technically a 
separate and distinct violation of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b). A spokeswoman 
for one of the hospitals said in a statement that “[e]ven though there were 
no findings of wrongdoing or liability, we agreed to the settlement to avoid 
the delay, uncertainty, inconvenience and expense of protracted litigation 
in a case that has been pending since 2008,”87 raising the troubling 
possibility that the hospital settled because settlement was the safest 
solution, and not because the hospital intended to break the law. 
In another recent case which alleged fraudulent hospital medical 
practices in 43 of the 50 states, a record-breaking 457 hospitals reached a 
$250 million settlement with the federal government.88 In that case, the 
Department of Justice alleged that the hospitals performed procedures 
placing implantable cardioverter defibrillators in patients too soon after 
bypass surgery, angioplasty or heart attacks.89 In cases like this, the 
question arises of whether a medical service provider should be punished 
for making the decision to perform procedures he or she may honestly 
believe are in the best interest of his or her patients merely because the 
government disagrees about the medical necessity of said procedures. 
Essentially, every single procedure where a health care provider 
implanted a cardioverter defibrillator in a Medicare or Medicaid patient 
when the health care professional truly believed the procedure was 
medically necessary and billed Medicare for that procedure constituted a 
violation of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b), and subjected that health care provider 
to potential felony charges.90 In this case, as in many others, the accused 
hospitals involved did not accept liability by the terms of the settlement, 
and many officials for the hospitals “maintain they gave their patients 
proper medical care but settled allegations to avoid further litigation.”91 A 
spokeswoman for another hospital which is also tied to the University of 
Maryland stated, “While the government’s focus was on the billing 
criteria, our primary focus has always been to ensure that our patients are 
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provided with appropriate care, and we are satisfied that appropriate care 
was, in fact, provided to our patients.”92 
Under The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ rules, 
defibrillators of the type at issue here “can only be implanted 40 days after 
a heart attack and 90 days after bypass surgery or angioplasty. The rules 
are designed to give patients’ heart function time to improve, possibly 
negating the need for a defibrillator, and were developed based on clinical 
trials and input from specialists, manufacturers and patient advocates.”93 
However, the rules do not take into account what rights health care 
professionals have in times of emergency, nor what rights they have when 
their opinions of what procedures are medically necessary conflict with 
Medicare’s rules. In these instances, health care professionals are forced 
to choose between what they truly believe is right for their patient and 
doing only what is considered medically necessary and covered by their 
patients’ insurance.94 In the words of Dr. Alan Cheng, a cardiologist and 
associate professor of medicine at the Johns Hopkins University School of 
Medicine, who was not involved in the settlement: 
[T]here are times when it doesn’t make sense to wait, such 
as when a patient’s heart function is so poor he’s 
scheduled for a defibrillator implant but has a heart attack 
before surgery. Other times a patient has a heart attack 
and function isn’t likely to improve, and doctors want to 
implant both a pacemaker and a defibrillator immediately. 
In that case, the patient would have to have two 
procedures to comply with the defibrillator rule.95 
As evidenced by these cases, in some instances, health care 
professional violators truly believe they are innocent, and the Statute as it 
currently exists does not require the government to prove actual 
knowledge or specific intent to sustain a conviction. Still, their actions are 
technically in violation of the law and subject them to felony punishments. 
To rectify the controlling power of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b)’s in these 
instances of general intent-based violations, Congress must amend the 
Statute’s provisions to provide for a differentiation between general and 
specific intent-based violations in terms of the severity of punishment and 
penalties available for violators of the law. Doing so would allow the 
government the ability to continue successfully prosecuting all violators 
of the Statute while recovering fraudulent funds and making health care 
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more affordable. For the less culpable offenders, this legislative action 
would allow them to avoid the severity of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b)’s 
potential wrath where there is no specific intent to defraud, and for the 
specific-intent violators, justice may rightly be served. Variations in 
punishments between specific and general intent violators can be made in 
the classification of their offenses as misdemeanors or felonies as well as 
in the severity of civil penalties available for the government to pursue. 
D. A Call For One Final Amendment: Preserving the Good SEEDS 
For Flourishing While Eliminating the Bad Seeds 
While one possibility is to amend U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b)’s provisions 
allowing for a differentiation in the severity of penalties available for 
general and specific intent violations, perhaps the better solution would be 
to make any violation of the Statute a specific intent-based crime. The 
government would most likely argue that the government needs to be able 
to effectively enforce the law, and specific intent-based crimes are harder 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt than are general intent-based crimes. 
Perhaps it should be harder for law enforcement to prove that our nation’s 
brightest individuals who have dedicated their lives to improving the 
American health care system are genuine criminals, given the message that 
that actuality would send to future generations of health care patients about 
the amount of protection they can expect as health care patients and about 
the trustworthiness of their health care professionals. 
If deterrence and the elimination of fraudulent providers are the goals 
of our government, why punish those individuals or entities who 
unknowingly violated the law when they’ve dedicated their entire lives to 
patient protection and treatment? Shouldn’t actual knowledge be a pre-
requisite to find guilt in these cases? In theory, deterrence involves 
punishing criminals so that future potential criminals are discouraged from 
committing the same wrongful and illegal acts. But when the alleged 
criminals were not even aware their actions were wrongful, U.S.C. 
§ 1320(a)-7(b) should not be able to destroy their reputations in the 
medical community forever. The patient protection focus of the PPACA 
is frustrated when those who devote their lives to protecting patients –our 
nation’s best and brightest health care providers—can face felony criminal 
charges for doing just that: protecting their patients. 
If the government aims to eliminate fraudulent providers, it should do 
just that. As noted in the cases of Dr. Fata and the mental health care 
professionals in Miami, specific intent to violate the Statute can be proven, 
and exposing those who specifically intend to defraud and eliminating 
them from our health care industry does ensure better patient protection in 
the future and does restore Medicare funds, making health care more 
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affordable. However, those health care providers who are potentially 
innocent or engage in conduct that only constitutes a violation of U.S.C. 
§ 1320(a)-7(b) because of the Statute’s over-broadness, should not be 
viewed in the same light nor legally treated in the same way as the clearly 
money hungry, fraudulent providers. Instead, they should be respected 
based on their merits and achievements in the field of medicine. They 
should be celebrated as well as appreciated for the hard work they do. They 
should be able to make determinations of what the best decisions are 
concerning medical treatments for their patients. And, they should be able 
to perform these actions without the fear of being criminally prosecuted, 
facing jail time, and facing endless attorney’s fees for violating an overly 
broad statute in the name of protecting their patients. For these reasons, 
society would benefit far greater from making U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) a 
specific-intent-based statute despite the fact that the government would 
undoubtedly recover more Medicare funds by not requiring specific intent 
nor actual knowledge to sustain a felony conviction under U.S.C. 
§ 1320(a)-7(b). 
The majority of health care fraud is intentionally committed by a 
minority of bad seeds.96 Inevitably, one bad seed can tremendously 
frustrate the ability for a garden to grow by the right means. Removing 
these bad seeds from our American Health Care System Garden and 
disallowing them the ability to devastate our Garden is of benefit to all 
Americans. But in order for our Garden to flourish, we need our 
metaphorical good seeds to continue working for the right reasons and to 
continue being encouraged to provide the best patient protection that they 
can. To realize patient protection and help make health care affordable for 
all Americans as envisioned under the PPACA, we as a nation need to call 
to our Congress’ attention the potential effects of this overly broad Statute 
on the ability of our good seeds to flourish. Otherwise, uncertainty exists 
as to which direction our Garden may grow. The best way to achieve this 
reality is by making a violation of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) one that requires 
a finding of specific-intent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There are several ways by which Congress can amend the current 
federal anti-kickback statute to better ensure patient protection under the 
PPACA and make health care affordable by means more reasonable for 
all. Some of the ways by which this can occur are by including guidelines 
in the PPACA which will provide victims of health care fraud with 
guidance of what steps to take and what rights they have when their health 
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care providers are accused of, charged with, or convicted of health care 
fraud; providing a notice requirement in the PPACA which requires health 
care providers to provide notice and the availability of potential rights to 
their current and past patients when charged with or convicted of violating 
health care fraud laws; allowing for a differentiation in the degree and/or 
level of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) violations in instances of general intent 
versus specific intent; or, making a violation of U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) a 
specific-intent based crime requiring a showing of actual knowledge 
before guilt can be found. 
Whether Congress is actually willing to amend U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7(b) 
to take into account its effect on the practicability of the PPACA may not 
only impact the future public opinion concerning the trustworthiness of 
American health care providers, but it also may frustrate key reasons of 
why the PPACA was enacted in the first place. Patient protection and 
affordable care will always come at a cost. But a large percentage of that 
cost should be paid by the bad seeds, while the good seeds are left to grow 
not only their professional medical practices, but also left a stronger, 
healthier American nation. 
 
